The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race
and Social Justice
Volume 17

Number 1

Article 33

1-1-2015

Mapping the Matrix: Defining the Balance between Executive
Action and Legislative Regulation in the Battlefield of Cyberspace.
Tyler K. Lowe

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tyler K. Lowe, Mapping the Matrix: Defining the Balance between Executive Action and Legislative
Regulation in the Battlefield of Cyberspace., 17 THE SCHOLAR (2015).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol17/iss1/33

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social
Justice by an authorized editor of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Lowe: Mapping the Matrix: Defining the Balance between Executive Action

MAPPING THE MATRIX: DEFINING THE BALANCE
BETWEEN EXECUTIVE ACTION AND LEGISLATIVE
REGULATION IN THE NEW BATTLEFIELD
OF CYBERSPACE
TYLER K. LOWE*

.....................................
I. Introduction.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. .. .
II. What is Cyber War?
III. The Scope of Legislative Authority to Authorize Cyber
...........................................
War
A. Textual and Judicial Support for Congressional Power
..............................
to Authorize War
i. The Constitution and Related Texts .............
ii. Judicial Development of Congressional
.................................
Authority

64
67

B. Congressional Initiatives to Authorize Cyber War ....
IV. The Scope of Executive Authority to Make Cyber War ...

73
75

69
69
69
71

A. Textual and Judicial Support for Presidential Power to
75
...................................
Make War
i. Constitutional Origins of Executive Power ....... .75
75
ii. Defensive Versus Offensive War Capabilities .....
80
iii. Covert Action and Reporting Procedures ........
80
B. Presidential Initiatives to Make Cyber War...........
V. Legislative Authority to Regulate Executive Action ....... .83
83
A. Constitutionally-Created Checks on the Executive ...
.84
......
B. The War Powers Resolution .............
84
C. Congressional Limitations on Covert Action .........
85
D. Executive Mitigation of Legislative Restraints ........
86
Powers
................
VI. Cyber War and the Separation of
86
A. The Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. Test ............
B. Zone One: The Zenith of Executive Authority ....... .87
88
C. Zone Two: The Twilight Zone....................
of
Executive
Ebb"
"Lowest
The
Three:
D. Zone
89
....................................
Authority
* Tyler K. Lowe is a 2014 graduate of St. Mary's University School of Law, J.D., and
a 2006 graduate of Texas A&M University, B.A. in American Studies. He currently serves

as a Counsel in the United States Congress.
63

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 1, Art. 33

64

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 17:63

VII. Civil Liberties and Unilateral Executive Authority to
Conduct Cyber Warfare
.............................
VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations ....................
I.

90
92

INTRODUCTION

On June 23, 2009, recently inaugurated President Barack Obama authorized the formation of The United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to protect the interests of the United States and conduct
military operations in cyberspace.' USCYBERCOM was placed under
the authority of The United States Strategic Command and tasked with
centralizing the cyberspace operations of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and
Marines. 2 Moreover, President Obama appointed the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA)-the lead federal agency for signal intelligence and information assurance3-to also serve as the Commander of
USCYBERCOM.
Almost four years later, at the end of President Obama's first term,
then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta thrust USCYBERCOM, and the
notion of cyber warfare, to the forefront of the American consciousness.'
In a watershed speech before the Business Executives for National Security in New York City, Secretary Panetta branded cyberspace as the new
frontier for the establishment of peace, security, and power in the twentyfirst century.6 Furthermore, the Secretary warned his audience, "cyber
attacks are every bit as real as the more well-known threats like terror-

1. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Securing our Nation's
Cyber Infrastructure (May 29, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/remarks-president-securing-our-nations-cyber-infrastructure) (announcing
the creation of a new office at the White House to be led by the Cybersecurity Coordinator
in a White House press release on May 29, 2009); see aso U.S. Cyber Command, Factsheets, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber-Command
(last updated Aug. 2013) (describing the creation and the mission of the United States
Cyber Command).
2. U.S. Cyber Command, supra note 1.
3. See About NSA: Mission, NAr'L SEc. AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/about/mission/
index.shtml (last updated Apr. 15, 2011) (describing the mission of the National Security
Agency).
4. See U.S. Cyber Command, supra note I (listing National Security Agency Director,
General Keith B. Alexander as the Commander of USCYBERCOM).
5. See Leon Panetta, U.S. Sec'y of Def., Remarks on the Global Threat of Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security in New York City (Oct. 12, 2012)
(transcript available at http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/secretary-leon-panettas-speechcybersecurity/p29262) (stressing the importance and seriousness of the cyber warfare).
6. See id. ("Cyberspace is the new frontier, full of possibilities to advance security and
prosperity in the 21st century. And yet, with these possibilities, also come new perils and
dangers.").
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ism, nuclear weapons proliferation, and the turmoil that we see in the
Middle East."'
During his speech, Secretary Panetta also laid the foundation of the
Obama administration's approach to cyber warfare.' Without qualification, Secretary Panetta avowed the Department of Defense was prepared
to respond to a "crippling cyber attack" and alternatively to pre-emptively strike if an imminent attack became apparent.' This signified a critical pivot in United States' cyber policy. For the first time in American
history, the Executive Branch conceded that it was not merely limited to
defensive operations in cyberspace.o Instead, Secretary Panetta acknowledged the ability of the United States military to wage an offensive
cyber war."
Around the same time as Secretary Panetta's speech, President Obama
signed Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD-20). 12 This classified directive, which was later leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden
in June 2013,13 establishes an Executive Branch framework for the approval of defensive and offensive cyber operations.14 PPD-20 was authored in response to repeated failures by Congress to adopt legislation
regulating cyber warfare."
Before the disclosure of PPD-20, an undisclosed legal review of the
United States' approach to cyber warfare affirmed the widely accepted
power of the President to order a pre-emptive strike to quell an imminent
cyber attack.1 6 However, the release of PPD-20 unveiled the true extent

7. Id.
8. See generally id. (discussing the dynamics of the broad approach taken by the Executive Branch to combat cyberwarfare).

9. Id.
10. Carlo Munoz, Panetta Acknowledges US has the Capacity to Wage Cyber Warfare,
Taiju HILL (Oct. 12, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/261705-panet
ta-unveils-aggressive-new-cyberwarsafre-strategy.
11. Id.
12. Carlo Munoz, Obama Authorizes New Cyber Warfare Directive, THE HILL (Nov.
14, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/267879-report-obama-au
thorizes-new-cyber-warfare-directive.
13. Glenn Greenwald et. al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA
Surveillance Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance.
14. See generally Glenn Greenwald & Ewan MacAskill, Obama Orders US to Draw
up Overseas Target List for Cyber-Attacks, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 7, 2013), http:/www
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/obama-china-targets-cyber-overseas (highlighting the
top-secret operational standards for cyber warfare in PPD-20).
15. See Munoz, supra note 12 (mentioning that the PPD-20 compensates for the failure of Congress to pass legislation to close gaps in the nation's cyber warfare policy).
16. See David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, Broad Powers Seen for Obama in Cyberstrikes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/us/broad-powers-
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of the President's self-granted authority to conduct cyber warfare: the
President reserves the right to utilize the cyber arsenal for defensive and
offensive operations without delineating bright line thresholds for either
type of attack." The Executive Branch failed to define when a threat
becomes so imminent as to allow for defensive attacks and provided only
an amorphous "[United States] national objectives around the world"
standard for when offensive attacks could be undertaken by U.S.
personnel.'
As recently as February 2013, it was believed that President Obama
had only employed the cyber arsenal once during his presidency, to attack
the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz." However, budget documents
leaked by Edward Snowden in August 201320 indicate the United States
conducted 231 cyber operations in 2011 alone. 2 1 While information is not
currently available to determine what percentage of the 231 cyber operations were used for intelligence gathering versus infrastructure destruction, it is apparent the Obama Administration has wholeheartedly
embraced defensive and offensive cyber tactics as a part of the national
security apparatus.22
The language of PPD-20 pays lip service to compliance with domestic
law, but it does not include any provisions for congressional approval of
cyber war.23 instead, presidential support is the highest level of approval
expressly required. 24 Therefore, an attack, possibly tantamount to an act
of war, could be perpetrated by the United States without the approval of
the Legislative Branch. This unchecked authorization process, specifically applying to cyber attacks, could produce "significant consequences,"
such as "loss of life, significant responsive actions against the United

seen-for-obama-in-cyberstrikes.html?pagewanted=aIl&_r=0 (recognizing the authority of
the President to respond to an imminent cyber attack on the United States).
17. See generally PRESIDENTIAL POitcy DIECTIVE/PPD-20 ON U.S. CYBER OPERATIONS POLICY FORH VICE PRESIDENT E' AL. (Oct. 2012), availableat http://www.fas.org/

irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-20.pdf (omitting any discernable standard for imminent threat or the
definition of an action in furtherance of national interests).
18. Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 14; see also PRESIDENIAL Poucy DIRECTIVE/PPD-20, supra note 17 (detailing the thresholds, or lack thereof, for defensive and
offensive cyber operations).
19. Sanger & Shanker, Broad Powers Seen for Obama in Cyberstrikes, supra note 16.
20. Greenwald et. al., supra note 13.
21. David E. Sanger, Budget Documents Detail the Extent of U.S. Cyberoperations,
N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/americas/docu
ments-detail-cyberoperations-by-us.html.
22. See id. (deriving the Obama administration's reliance upon cyber operations from
the numerous attacks launched in 2011).
23. See Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 14 (mentioning only that presidential approval, and not congressional, is needed for the most intrusive cyber attacks).
24. Id.
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States, significant damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign policy
consequences, or serious economic impact on the United States." 25
Through both the Bush and Obama administrations, Congress has been
unable to pass comprehensive legislation regulating cyber war.26 As a
result of congressional silence, the Obama administration has been forced
to articulate the current cyber warfare structure and polices of the United
States, as seen in PPD-20. As one senior administration official recently
said, "Once humans develop the capacity to build boats, we build navies.
Once you build airplanes, we build air forces." 27 And, as this article will
argue, once a navy, air force, or cyber military is built, accompanying regulations are also needed.
The current, virtually unchecked authority of the President to conduct
defensive and offensive cyber attacks is a natural byproduct of the Executive Branch drafting the domestic rules for cyber warfare. Thus, the Legislative Branch must act to impose original or existing regulations to rein
in this novel and developing authority of the President.
II.

WHAT IS CYBER WAR?

National security expert Richard A. Clarke defines cyber war as "actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption." 2 8
Alternatively, the Joint Chiefs of Staff define "Cyber Warfare" as "[an
armed conflict conducted in whole or part by cyber means" and
"[m]ilitary operations conducted to deny an opposing force the effective
use of cyberspace systems and weapons in a conflict." 29 When compared,
these definitions present three prerequisites for cyber war. 30 Such prerequisites help to differentiate cyber war from lesser cyber attacks, cyber25. Presidential Policy Directive 20, U.S. CYBER OE'RATIONS POLICY, 9 (Oct. 16,
2012), availableat https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-20.pdf.
26. See generally JOHN RotIuNs & ANNA C. HENNING, CONG. RESEARlCH SERV.,
R40427, COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE: LEGAL Aumournres
AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS (2009) (discussing the abundance of Executive Branch ac-

tion and lack of legislative input in the developing field of cyber warfare).
27. Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 14.

28.

RICHARD A. CLARKE

&

ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT

TiHREAT TO

NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO Do Anour I 6 (First Ecco Paperback ed. 2012).
29. Memorandum from James E. Cartwright, Gen., U.S. Marine Corps, on Joint Ter-

minology for Cyberspace Operations to the Chiefs of the Military Services, Commanders

of the Combatant Commands, & Directors of the Joint Staff Directorates 8 (2011), available at http://www.nsci-va.org/CyberReferenceLib/201 0-11-Joint%20Terminology%20for%
20Cyberspace%200perations.pdf.

30. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. Rv. 817,
82236-37 (2012) (classifying cyber operations to determine which actions rise to the level
of a cyber attack, in the context of cyber warfare).
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espionage, and cybercrime-an important distinction because these latter
subsets of cybersecurity are subjected to different domestic and international legal strictures.3 1
The first prerequisite for cyber war is that there must be a cyber attack
by or upon a nation.3 2 A cyber attack is defined as "any action taken to
undermine the functions of a computer network for a political or national
security purpose.",3 The second prerequisite is the cyber attack must be
tantamount to an "armed attack" in traditional-kinetic warfare. 34 A
cyber attack is equivalent to an armed attack when physical injury, death,
or significant destruction is the proximate result of a cyber assault." The
final prerequisite is that if a cyber attack does not rise to the level of an
armed attack, it may still fall beneath the umbrella of cyber war if it occurs within the framework of a conventional armed conflict. 3 6
PPD-20 further defines cyber attacks by classifying them into two categories: defensive and offensive operations." Defensive cyber attacks are
used to safeguard against imminent cyber or kinetic "threats or ongoing
attacks" counter to the interests of the United States.3 8 Conversely, offensive cyber operations are loosely defined as actions "that are intended
to enable or produce cyber effects outside United States Government
networks" and do not include defensive measure or intelligence collection." Cyber effects include "[t]he manipulation, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction of computers, information or communications
systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident thereon." 4 0

31. See generally id. (analyzing different actions in cyberspace in an effort to define

cyber attack and lesser cyber incidents).
32. See id. at 836-37 (classifying cyber operations to determine which actions rise to
the level of a cyber attack, in the context of cyber warfare).

33. Id. at 826.
34. Id. at 836-37.
35. See Aram Roston, U.S.: Laws of War Apply to Cyber Attacks, ARMy TIMEs (Sept.
18, 2012), http://www.armytimes.com/article/20120918/NEWS/209180311/U-S-Laws-of-warapply-to-cyber-attacks (reporting on the comments of United States Department of State
legal advisor Harold Koh regarding the domestic and international legal strictures applicable to cyber warfare).
36. See Hathaway et al., supra note 30, at 836-37 (classifying cyber operations to determine which actions rise to the level of a cyber attack, in the context of cyber warfare).
37. PRESIDENTIAL PoLicy DIREGrIvEPPD-20, supra note 17.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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THE SCOPE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO
AUTHORIZE CYBER WAR

Textual and Judicial Support for Congressional Power to Authorize
War
i.

The Constitution and Related Texts

Article I, Section Eight of the Constitution of the United States vests in
Congress the power "[t]o declare War."4 1 Alternatively, the President is
empowered to conduct, or "make," war.42 This dichotomy was installed
to prevent the President from attaining the unilateral war powers of the
British monarchy.4 3 Congressional authorization was intended to slow
the march to war and prevent any one individual from possessing the sole
power to commit the nation to armed conflict. 44
George Washington and his contemporaries believed congressional authorization was a prerequisite for the use of force that was not conducted
in self-defense.4 5 In response to Native American attacks on the western
frontier, President Washington stated: "The Constitution vests the power
of declaring war with Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they shall have deliberated on the
subject, and authorized such a measure. "46
Congress has only declared war five times in the history of the United
States.47 Obviously, these conflicts do not encompass the entirety of U.S.

41. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8.
42. See U.S. CONsT. art. 2, § 2 (expressly stating "[t]he President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States").
43. See TiHE FEDERALIST, No. 69, 418 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Classic ed.,
1982) (discussing the resemblance of the power granted to the President and the power of
Great Britain's monarch while also highlighting the purposeful differences).
44. See 2 TIHE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
BY THE STATES-PENNSYLVANIA 583 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (examining the importance
and necessity of the division of war powers between the president and Congress).

45. See 33

T-E WRITINGS or GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM
73 available at http://web.archive.org/web/20110220

GEORGE WASHINGTON,

THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

233049/http://etext.Iib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=WasFi33.xml&vimages=images/

modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=59&division=div1

(John

C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1997) (including President George Washington's thoughts on offensive

measures against the Creek Nation necessitating an evaluation and authorization by
Congress).
46. Id.
47. See CURTis A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMnri, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw 221
(4th ed. 2011) ("[T]he War of 1812; the Mexican-American War of 1846-48; the Spanish-American War of 1898; World War 1; and World War II.").
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military action over the preceding two centuries.4 8 Instead, Congress either approved a lesser "use of force," rather than a full declaration of
war, or remained silent. 4 9
The classic view of the early presidents, requiring congressional approval, must be juxtaposed with the modern view of unilateral executive
action.so This assessment, most famously forwarded by Professor John
Yoo, claims the Declaration of War Clause was merely intended as a trigger for rights and procedures under international law, and not a limit on
executive power." Rather, the true authority of Congress to restrain
presidential war-making power lay in its ability to manage the budget of
the armed forces.52 This can be seen in Article I, Section Eight of the
U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress to "raise and support Armies."" Moreover, The Federalist Papers, specifically numbers 24 and
25, clearly charge Congress with this vital national security task. 5 4 Federalist 24 reserves the autonomous authority to create and fund military
forces for Congress, 5 5 while Federalist25 articulates the importance of
standing armies in times of peace and war.5 6 The author, Alexander
Hamilton, urged his readers not to be "dupes" in their reliance on militias
to provide the requisite protection for the nation. Mr. Hamilton further
declared the nation must be prepared to counter the might of a "regular

48. See id. ("[TJhe United States has utilized military force in hundreds of situations
not involving declarations of war.").
49. See id. (enumerating the instances of United States military engagement, both declared and undeclared, on the international stage).
50. See id. at 223-24 (analyzing the different views of the power the Declare War
Clause of the Constitution grants the Legislative Branch to sanction war).

51. See John Yoo & James C. Ho, Essays on Article I: Declare War, The Heritage
Guide to the Constitution, TilE HERYI'AiE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/
articles/l/essays/49/declare-war (last visited June 12, 2014) (asserting an Executive Branchcentric viewpoint on the constitutional authority of Congress to declare war).
52. See BRADLEY & GoLosMIrm, supra note 47, at 224 (quoting Yoo, in regards to

Constitutional power to wage war, "that Congress retains an ultimate check on presidential
power through its appropriations power").
53. U.S. CONsTr. art I, § 8, cl. 12.
54. See BRADIEY & Goitosmiurni, supra note 47, at 209-10 (showing the constitutional
assignment of congressional war powers as discussed in The FederalistPapers).
55. See THE FEDERALIS'T, No. 24, 138 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Classic ed.,

1982) (analyzing the division of authority regarding the United States military and specifically highlighting the exclusive power of the legislature to raise and support an army and
navy).
56. See TiH- FEDERALIST, No. 25, 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Classic ed.,
1982) (forwarding the argument a perpetually standing military, even in times of peace,
gains more experience and therefore can better protect and serve the national security
interests of the United States).
57. Id.
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and disciplined army" with a potent force of the same ilk." In a harbinger of future defense philosophies Mr. Hamilton said: "War, like most
other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by
perseverance, by time, and by practice." 59
ii. Judicial Development of Congressional Authority
Three important cases, Bas v. Tingy,60 Little v. Barreme,6 and Orland
v. Laird,6 2 which spanned from the undeclared war with France to the
Vietnam War, further developed the constitutional power conferred upon
Congress to authorize war.63
In Bas v. Tingy, 64 the Supreme Court addressed the status of an "enemy" nation in the absence of an official declaration of war.6 ' The Court
divided public war, which it defined as any government-approved use of
force between two nations, into two categories: public general war and
public qualified war. 6 6 In a general war, a formal declaration has occurred and both nations are authorized "to commit hostilities against all
the members of the other, in every place, and under every circumstance[,]
..
and all the rights and consequences of war" are attached to their
actions.6 ' But, in a qualified war, no official declaration has occurred and
the militaries and persons of both nations are restrained in their actions.6 1
This limitation does not, however, preclude the existence of an actual
war. 69

In essence, Congress may thus authorize a restricted war against a foreign nation by a decree of less substantiality than a formal declaration of
war, while the Executive is restricted within the bounds established by
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).
61. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
62. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971).
63. See generally BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 211-21 (depicting the
judicial evolution of the constitutional clause that grants Congress the authority to Declare
War).
64. Bas, 4 U.S. 37.
65. See generally BRADLEY & GoLSMifii, supra note 47 (discussing congressional
and Executive Branch action regarding the military during the undeclared war with
France).
66. See Bas, 4 U.S. at 40, 44 (differentiating between the status and rights of enemy
nations during times of war that have been formally authorized and hostilities that have
not received full a declaration of approval).
67. Id. at 40.

68. See id. at 40-41.
69. See id. (noting that although hostilities are limited between two powers, the conflict remains a "public war" in which there is "an external contention by force, between
some of the members of two nations, authorized [sic] by the legitimate powers").
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the Legislative Branch. 70 This restraint on presidential authority was reaffirmed four years later in the second important case, Little v. Barreme,'71
and still stands as good law. 2
The third important case, Orland v. Laird, is a Second Circuit Vietnamera case that expressed three significant judicial interpretations of the legislative power to authorize war.73 First, the court of appeals held congressional authorizations of war do not have to be expressly stated.7 4
Instead, legislative permission may be inferred from collaboration between the President and Congress, and congressional participation in the
Second, the court acknowledged that
preparation and execution of war.
an express declaration of war, when both branches are in agreement
about the necessity of action, would be burdensome, unnecessarily constrain the President, and be contrary to the interests of the nation.7 6 Finally, the court expressed its discomfort with forcing Congress and the
President to adopt a clear mechanism for declarations of war, for fear it
would impinge upon the flexibility and independence of the two political
branches. 77
Therefore, after Orlando v. Laird, congressional authority to declare
war no longer requires a formal declaration of war.7 ' Instead, an authorization of force is adequate to permit action by the President.7 ' This authorization may be inferred from legislation, appropriations, and
congressional consent to executive operations.8 0 Thus, the independent
legislative duty to raise and support armies now serves as evidence of
congressional authorization for the use of force in a qualified war.

70. See Bas id. at 40 (affirming that "those who are authorized to commit hostilities,
act under special authority, and can go no farther than to the extent of their commission").
71. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); see Stephen Dycus, Congress's
Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAr'L SiEcuiu'rY L. & Pot'y 155, 157 (2010) (exploring the
role of Congress in determining when the United States should enter into a military
conflict).
72. Dycus, supra note 71, at 157 (stating that since Little v. Barreme no court has
ruled otherwise).

73. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971).
74. Id. at 1043.
75. See id. at 1042-43
Branch no longer necessary
congressional action such as
by the President that such
Southeast Asia").
76. Id. at 1043.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1042-43.

(finding an express declaration of war from the Legislative
to formally authorize war; a declaration may be inferred from
the appropriation of $700 million for use "upon determination
action is necessary in connection with military activities in

79. Id.
80. Id.
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CongressionalInitiatives to Authorize Cyber War

To date, Congress has not issued a formal declaration of cyber war
against a foreign nation, nor has it authorized a lesser use of cyber force
against an enemy state.8 However, the 2001 Authorization for the Use
of Military Force8 2 could provide congressional approval for cyber warfare aimed at al-Qa'eda, the Taliban, or associated forces.
Traditionally, legislation on cyber issues has been limited to the cybercrime offenses and penalties, and the establishment of administrative procedures to prevent cyber attacks on executive agencies." But, in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA-FY12),
Congress officially recognized the ability of the Executive Branch to conduct offensive cyber warfare:
Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability,
and upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in
cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to-(1) the
policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and (2) the War
Powers Resolution.8 5
While not a formal declaration of war or specific authorization of force,
this language could be construed as an example of inferred approval for
the use of cyber force. 86 Congress reiterated its support for presidential
authority to initiate cyber war in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA-FY13).
These authorizations resolved two issues regarding cyber warfare.
First, they laid the foundation for executive authority to conduct offensive cyber operations." Second, the acts were a precondition for the ap-

81. Dycus, supra note 71, at 157.
82. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
83. See RoLLINS & HENNING, supra note 26, at 9, 12 (listing presidential authorities
that could be used to justify unilateral Executive Branch implementation of cyber warfare
operations).
84. See id. at 3-5 (cataloging previous attempts by Congress to legislate protections
from cyber attacks).
85. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011).
86. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (2nd Cir. 1971) (explaining that congressional action can be interpreted as authorization from Congress the making of war).
87. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No.
112-239, § 940, 126 Stat. 1632, 1888-89 (2013) (reaffirming the congressional recognition of
presidential power to conduct offensive cyberwarfare).
88. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 954, 125 Stat. at
1551 ("Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests") (emphasis added).
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propriation of funds to support the designated activity.8 Accordingly,
after the passage of NDAA-FY12 the Executive Branch officially possessed the authority to conduct offensive cyber operations, so long as they
conformed to the traditional rules of armed conflict and the War Powers
Resolution.9 0
Congress provides defense appropriations legislation to fund the activities and programs enumerated in the NDAA. 91 In fiscal year 2013, the
Department of Defense utilized $3.9 billion of its appropriated funds for
cyber operations. 9 2 In 2014, the Department requested a twenty percent
increase to $4.7 billion. .9 Additionally, defense officials plan to increase
the number of USCYBERCOM employees from 900 to 4,90094 and have
made it abundantly clear that cyber warfare funding will not be affected
by forced-sequestration cuts. 9 5
Essentially, Congress has raised and supported a standing cyber army,
and its authorizations for the use of offensive force infer a grant of authority upon the Executive Branch. Therefore, continued appropriations
for cyber warfare operations, coupled with the power conveyed in
NDAA-FY12 and NDAA-FY13, provide the Executive Branch with the
authority to employ offensive cyber force.

89. See Budget Process:Authorization vs Appropriation, U.S. SENATE COMMI-TEE ON
http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/content/budget-process (last visited August 13, 2014) (defining the purpose of congressional authorizations).
90. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 954, 125 Stat. at
1551 ("[U]pon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace
to defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to-(1) the policy principles and legal
regimes that the Departmentfollows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and (2) the War Powers Resolution.") (emphasis added).
91. See Budget Process, U.S. SENATE COMMI-fEE ON APiPioRIATIONs ("For discretionary spending, the role of the authorizing committees is to enact legislation that serves
as the basis for operating a program and that provides guidance to the Appropriations
Committees as to an appropriate level of funding for the program.").
92. See Jim Michaels, Pentagon Expands Cyber-Attack Capabilities, USA ToAY
(Apr. 21, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/21 /pentagon-expand
ing-offensive-cyber-capabilities/2085135/ (detailing the funds used and requested by the
Department of Defense for cyber warfare operations).
93. See id. (detailing the funds used and requested by the Department of Defense for
cyberwarfare operations).
94. Tom Gjelten & Audie Cornish, All Things Considered: Pentagon to Dramatically
Expand 'Cyber Warrior' Force, NATIONAL Pu13uc RADIO (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.npr
.org/2013/01/28/170494486/pentagon-to-dramatically-expand-cyber-warrior-force.
95. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Defense Budget Cuts Would Limit
Raises and Close Bases, N. Y. TIMEs (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/us/
pentagon-proposes-limiting-raises-and-closing-bases-to-cut-budget.html?pagewanted=1 &_
r=0 (reporting the Obama Administration's steadfast support of cyber warfare operations,
despite across-the-board budget cuts).
APPRoPRIATIONs,
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SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO MAKE CYBERWAR

Textual and Judicial Support for PresidentialPower to Make War

A.

Constitutional Origins of Executive Power

i.

The entirety of "[t]he executive Power" of the United States is vested
solely in the President.9 6 This grant of authority is broader than that of
Congress, which is limited to a list of enumerated powers. 7 Consequently, constitutional scholars generally agree the President possesses
expansive power to conduct international affairs, including war, except
where constitutional authority is reserved to Congress."
The war power of the Executive is buttressed by Article II, Section
Two, Clause One, which appoints the President as "Commander in
Chief" of the armed forces." Consequently, the President is charged
with "the supreme command and direction of the military and naval
forces, as first General and admiral" of the United States." The Executive was vested with this unilateral power to provide for efficient and responsive decision-making by a single individual rather than a
committee.' 1 As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. CurtissWright Corp., the President, as leader of the military, diplomatic, and intelligence corps, is uniquely positioned with the knowledge and ability to
2
act as the "sole organ of the nation" for external affairs.'o
ii.

Defensive Versus Offensive War Capabilities

There is a dearth of law defining when the President may instigate military action without congressional approval.' 0 3 This is largely the result of
judicial reluctance to interfere with the political decisions of the Execu-

96. U.S. CONsT. art II, § 1, cl. 1.
97. See Yoo & Ho, supra note 51 (claiming the constitutional grant of war making
authority to the president is more expansive than that afforded to Congress).

98. Id.
99. U.S. CONs-r. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
100. Tim FEDERALIST, No. 69, 418 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Classic ed., 1982).
101. See Yoo & Ho, supra note 51 (alleging history supports the proposition of an

individual, rather than a committee of leaders, making military decisions in a time of war).
102. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting John Marshall in an argument he made to the House of Representatives on March 7,
1800).
103. See ERWIN CI-IEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 381
(4th ed. 2011) (acknowledging the absence of judicial decisions concerning either the use of
unilateral Executive Branch action to initiate military operations or the power of Congress
to halt preexisting military engagement).
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tive and Legislative Branches.' 0 4 The federal courts have continuously
categorized judicial challenges to foreign policy and the use of war pow05
ers as nonjusticiable political questions.
Nonetheless, as Commander-in-Chief, the President is constitutionally
vested with the authority to lead U.S. military operations.' 0 6 This includes the right to lead in both defensive and offensive actions.' 0 7 It is
generally accepted that to initiate or conduct defensive operations no authorization from Congress is required, so long as they are conducted in
response to an actual harm or imminent threat. 0 8 On the other hand, to
initiate or conduct offensive measures he may be required to get congressional approval.' 09
James Madison first championed the defensive capabilities of the Executive Branch during the drafting of the Constitution." 0 Mr. Madison
moved to replace the phrase "make war" with "declare war," in the enumeration of Legislative powers, to preserve the authority of the President
to "repel sudden attacks.""' The Supreme Court later recognized this
power in The Prize Cases.'1 2
The Prize Cases decision denied the President the "power to initiate or
declare a war," but it did allow for unilateral executive action in the event
of "invasion by foreign nations."" In fact, the Court found that the
President is bound by the Constitution to repel a use of force with
force." 4 In furtherance of this duty, the Executive Branch alone is to
104. See id. (attributing judicial reluctance to weigh in on war powers to the doctrine
of political question, which deems these issues are best left to the Executive and Legislative Branches of the government to decide).
105. See id. (attributing judicial reluctance to weigh in on war powers to the doctrine
of political question, which deems these issues are best left to the Executive and Legislative Branches of the government to decide).
106. U.S. CONsT. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
107. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1863) (stating the President "is the Commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several States when called into the actual service of the United States").

108. Id.

109. See id. (defining situations where the Constitution either limits Executive Branch
power to initiate war or affords the president authority to conduct military operations
without prior approval from Congress).
110. See 2 TiE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION oF 1787 318-319 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (documenting Mr. Madison's participation in the debate on the power of
government to "make" or "declare" war).
111. Id. at 318.
112. See generally The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (asserting the President's authority to
act without congressional approval in the case of the militant attack on the United States).

113. Id. at 668.

114. See id. (defining situations where the Constitution either limits Executive Branch
power to initiate war or affords the president authority to conduct military operations
without prior approval from Congress).
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decide the details of a proportional retaliation."'s Thus, when the United
States is attacked, the President is obligated to formulate a response, and
there is no requirement he wait for Congress to "baptize" the conflict
with a formal authorization. 1 16
Presidential authority to repel sudden attacks has traditionally been
limited to acts of "anticipatory self-defense."' 17 Former Secretary of
State Daniel Webster established U.S. guidelines for anticipatory self-defense in an 1842 diplomatic note regarding the sinking of an American
ship by British forces."1 8 Secretary Webster proclaimed "anticipatory action" is allowable only when "the necessity of that self-defense is instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."i'" Therefore, within these parameters, the President is permitted to initiate defensive military action when an attack from a foreign
20
nation is imminent and there is no time to pursue non-military options.1
Fast approaching warplanes and armed forces marching toward a border
are both examples of imminent attacks.121
However, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the United States announced a new strategy of pre-emptive self-defense.1 2 2 The United States National Security Strategy of September
2002 stated, "To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries,
the United States will, if necessary act pre-emptively" and "as a matter of
common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging
threats before they are fully formed."1 2 3 Consequently, the authority of
the President to conduct defensive military operations has been extended, because the imminence prerequisite is either significantly diminished or entirely discarded.1 2 4

115. Id. at

670.

116. Id. at 669.
117. See STEPHEN C.

MCCAIFREY,

UNDERSTANDING

INTERNATIONAL LAw

242-43

(2006) (discussing actions which gives rise to self-defense, specifically triggers for anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defense, and the recent policy transition of the United States
from the former to the latter).
118. Id. at 243.
119. A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 412 (John Basset Moore ed., 1906).
120. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 117, at 243 (remarking that Mr. Webster's statement
"has been widely accepted as an authoritative statement relative to the customary law of
self-defense and was referred to approvingly by the Nuremburg Tribunal").
121. Id. at 242.
122. Id.
123. THE Wiirm HousE, THIE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA 15 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza

tion/63562.pdf.
124. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 117, at 242-45 (discussing the adoption of the policy
of pre-emptive self-defense articulated by the U.S. National Security Strategy issued in

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 17 [2022], No. 1, Art. 33

78

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 17:63

Alternatively, the President may conduct offensive military operations
supported by a congressional declaration of war or authorization for the
use of force.125 Therefore, the Executive may utilize armed force, without any basis in self-defense, to the extent authorized by the Legislative
Branch. 12 6 Nevertheless, modern presidents have continually claimed the
ability to "commit US troops abroad" and "take military action" for the
protection of "important national interests," without prior congressional
authorization.1 27 The foundation for this assertion of authority is said to
arise from the Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief clauses of Article II, coupled with more than two centuries of practice.1 28 Accordingly,
executive officials have argued the "historical gloss" on the Constitution
is rife with presidential uses of force sans approval from Congress.1 2 9
And, presidential attorneys argue, this practical application informs constitutional interpretation.1 3 0 However, executive representatives acknowledge that the President is constitutionally precluded from initiating
military action, even for the protection of national interests, when it
would be equivalent to war, as described in the Article I Declaration of
War Clause."' Hence, the President must conduct a fact-specific analysis
of the "anticipated nature, scope, and duration" of a potential military
action to determine whether it is tantamount to war. 1 32 If it would be
tantamount to war, a declaration from Congress is required.1 33
If the President wishes to initiate military operations without congressional authorization, the administration must conduct a two-pronged

September, 2002, and suggesting that "the use of force in pre-emptive self-defense does not
appear to be permissible either under Article 51 or under customary international law").
125. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1863) (stating "Congress alone has the
power to declare a national or foreign war" but the President "is the Commander in chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when
called into the actual service of the United States").
126. See generally Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800) (differentiating in the status and
rights of enemy nations during times of war that have been formally authorized as opposed
to hostilities that have not received full a declaration of approval).
127. Memorandum Opinion from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., on Authority to Use Military Force in Libya to the Attorney Gen. 6 (Apr. 1,
2011), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20110401-authoritymilitary-use-in-libya.pdf.
128. Id.
129. See id. (discussing the "historical glass" on the power of the Executive Branch
specifically).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 9.
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analysis. 134 First, the Executive must determine whether a significant national interest is served to allow the President to utilize Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief authority.13 5 The protection of American citizens and property, 3 6 regional stability, and the credibility of international organization and treaties are historical examples of sufficient
national interests.

37

Second, the President must determine whether the nature, scope, and
duration of the desired operation are extensive enough to require a congressional authorization of war. 38 This multi-faceted analysis is unique
for each situation, but will usually include such queries as: how many
ground troops are required; what is the end goal of the mission; what is
the risk of escalation; is sustained conflict foreseeable; and, whether there
is a plan for withdrawal. 13 9

134. See id. at 10 (relying on the framework established by Supreme Court precedent,
turns on two questions: first,
"the President's legal authority to direct military force ...
whether United States operations . . . would serve sufficiently important national interest

to permit the President's action as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant
to his authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations; and second, whether the military operations that the President anticipated ordering would be sufficiently extensive in 'nature,
scope, and duration' to constitute a 'war' requiring prior specific congressional approval
under the Declaration of War Clause").
135. See id. (following Supreme Court precedent, the President's legal authority to
use military force in Libya turned first on "whether United States operation in Libya
would serve sufficiently important national interests to permit the President's action as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his authority to conduct U.S.
foreign relations").
136. See Memorandum from Timothy E. Flanigan, Assistant Attorney Gen., on Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia to the Attorney Gen. (Dec. 4,
1992), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Memorandumfrom-Timothy-E.-Flanigan-Assistant-Attorney-Gen.-to-the-Attorney-General-"Memorandum-Opinion-for-the-Attorney-General"-Dec.-4-19921 .pdf (denoting the protection of
American citizens and American property as a justification for the use of force by the
President).
137. See Krass, supra note 127, at 10 (denoting two national interest-preserving regional stability and supporting the United Nations Security Council's credibility and effectiveness-as a justification for the use of force by the President).
138. See id. at 18 (following Supreme Court precedent, the President's legal authority
to use military force in Libya turned second on "whether the military operations that the
President anticipated ordering would be sufficiently extensive in 'nature, scope, and duration' to constitute a 'war' requiring prior specific congressional approval under the Declaration of War Clause").
139. See id. at 13 (applying the analysis to determine whether limited airstrikes and
associated support missions in Libya were within President Obama's legal authority).
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Covert Action and Reporting Procedures

Covert operations offer an alternate avenue for the President to assert
limited war powers.14 0 Covert action is defined as "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly."l 4 ' The Executive may initiate these clandestine operations, via a
presidential finding, so long as designated members of Congress are informed of the action prior to its launch or, under extenuating circumstance, within a timely fashion.' 4 2 However, the President may not utilize
covert action authority to conduct "traditional diplomatic or military activities."I 4 3 Rather, military participation in covert operations must be
limited to secretive missions "not under the direction and control of a
military commander."' 4 4
B.

PresidentialInitiatives to Make Cyber War

President Obama has ordered the creation of USCYBERCOM,14 5 conducted at least one known cyberwar operation,'1 46 and authored PPD-20
to assert executive authority in the realm of cyber warfare.1 47 While the
existence of these activities is known, many of the details remain classified. However, the intentions of the Obama administration can be inferred from the public record.
In 2009, President Obama authorized the use of a cyberweapon to attack the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz.1 4 8 The weapon, a virus later
named Stuxnet, covertly interrupted the oscillation pattern of nuclear

140. BRADLEY & Goosrrni, supra note 47, at 274.

141. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006).
142. See BRADLEY & GotoDsmi-i, supra note 47, at 288 (outlining two exceptions to
the President's duty to report covert actions).

143. § 413b(e)(2).
144. BRADLEY & Goi osmri, supra note 47, at 290.
145. See Obama, supra note 1 (announcing the creation of a new office at the White
House to be led by the Cybersecurity Coordinator in a White House press release on May

29, 2009).
146. David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyber Attacks Against Iran,
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-or
dered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing the "increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer system that run Iran's main nuclear enrichment facilities").
147. See generally PRESIJDENTIAL POLicY DmrncnViE-/PPD-20, supra note 17 (enumerating the cyber warfare policy for the United States).
148. Sanger, supra note 146. Early in his presidency, President Obama covertly initiated "increasingly sophisticated" attacks against Iranian computer systems at nuclear enrichment facilities, "significantly expanding" the use of cyberweapons. Id.
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centrifuges, while allowing for a normal display on computer monitors. 14 9
It is difficult to report the exact damage caused by the Stuxnet virus, because Iran is understandably unwilling to share that information, but,
some accounts from within the Obama administration claim the infrastructure damage was bad enough to set the Iranian nuclear program
back eighteen to twenty-four months."so
It is difficult to determine whether the Obama administration classified
Stuxnet as a military or intelligence operation, because the U.S. Government has not formally recognized the project. Rather, the United States
has only accepted responsibility via leaked reports to The New York
Times.15 1 However, in a June 2012 article in Congressional Quarterly,
Senator Carl Levin stated the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and not the Armed Services Committee was briefed on the Stuxnet virus.1 5 2 Thus, it can be inferred the Obama administration treated the offensive operation in Iran as a covert operation and not military action."5
Regardless of the classification of the operation or the actual amount of
damage inflicted upon Iran, the United States "crossed a Rubicon in
cyberspace" when the President authorized the launch of the Stuxnet virus. 1 5 4 It appears-for the first time-the United States invaded the sovereignty of a foreign state with a cyberweapon to destroy critical
infrastructure.15 5
More recently, in late 2012, President Obama issued PPD-20 to define
the cyber war authority of the Executive.1 56 This classified directiveone of the documents leaked to the public by Snowden 1 7-reserves pres-

149. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 295 (explaining how the Stuxnet virus
damaged computers at the Natanz, Iran nuclear facility).
150. Sanger, supra note 146.
151. See generally id. (reporting on President Obama's decision to attack the Iranian
nuclear facility with a cyberweapon and the aftermath of the cyberassault).
152. See Tim Starks, Sorting Out Rules of Cyber War, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
(June 16, 2012, 1:05PM), http://public.cq.com/docs/weeklyreport/weeklyreport-0000041074
97.html ("Levin says he was not briefed about [Stuxnet] but that he believes the leaders of
the Intelligence panels were.").
153. See id. ("The vice chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, Georgia
Republican Saxby Chambliss, would only say: 'We are briefed on a good deal of what

happens in cyber.'").
154. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 296.
155. See generally CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 296 (discussing the history,
impact, and potential ramifications of President Obama's novel decision to deploy the
Stuxnet virus and thereby legitimize cyber warfare).
156. Presidential Policy Directive 20, U.S. CYBER OPERATIONS POLICY (Oct. 16,
2012), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-20.pdf.
157. See generally Greenwald et. al., supra note 13.
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idential power to conduct defensive and offensive cyber operations.15
Even though historical and legal precedent would only allow the President to deploy the extraordinarily destructive potential of cyber power to
protect traditional national interests from an actual or imminent harm or
as the result of congressional approval, PPD-20 provides the President
with a more expansive authority to initiate cyber attacks.1 5 9
The Obama Administration has yet to release a "red line" imminence
test to clarify when a foreign nation's cyber operations rise to the level of
imminent attack, thereby justifying defensive maneuvers by the President. 16 0 However, John 0. Brennan, the author of the administration's
policy on drone strikes, was also the thought-leader behind PPD-20.161
Thus, one may assume the standard for an imminent attack in PPD-20 is
similar to the analysis detailed in the white paper on drones.1 6 2 If this is
the case, then no clear evidence of a specific attack is required to trigger
the self-defense powers of the Executive Branch. 1 63 Instead, a situationspecific analysis is to be applied, considering the "window of opportunity" for stopping an attack, the "possibility of reducing collateral damage to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks
on Americans."1 6 4
Similarly, to initiate an offensive cyber attack, the President needs only
to act in furtherance of "national objectives around the world."1 65 National objectives include "matters of vital interest to the United States to
include national security, public safety, national economic security, the
safe and reliable function of 'critical infrastructure,' and the availability of

158. See generally Presidential Policy Directive 20, U.S. CYER OPERATIONS POLICY
(enumerating the cyber warfare policy for the United States).
159. See id. (asserting that "[Offensive Cyber Effects Operations] can offer unique
and unconventional capabilities to advance U.S. national objectives around the world with
little or no warning to the adversary or target and with potential effects ranging from subtle to severely damaging").
160. See generally Sanger & Shanker, Broad Powers Seen for Obama in Cyberstrikes,
supra note 16 (reporting that "[a] secret legal review on America's growing arsenal of
cyberweapons has concluded that President Obama has the broad power to order a preemptive strike if the United States detects credible evidence of a major digital attack looming from abroad").
161. Id.
162. See generally Memorandum from Department of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal
Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of AlQa'ida or An Associated Force 7 (2013), availableat http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/ilmsnbc/
sections/news/020413_DOJWhitePaper.pdf.
163. See id. (clarifying the imminent danger requirement necessary to initiate a drone
strike).

164. Id.
165. Presidential Policy Directive 20, U.S. CYER OPERATIONS PoIcy, 9 (Oct. 16,
2012), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-20.pdf.
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'key resources."'1 6 6 This vague rationale for action provides the President near universal justification to initiate offensive cyber operations.
Finally, during the creation of USCYBERCOM, which consolidated
the cyber capabilities of all four military branches under one central command, President Obama appointed General Keith B. Alexander, the Director of the NSA, to serve simultaneously as the Commander of
USCYBERCOM.1 6 7 At the recommendation of Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates, President Obama created this "dual-hatted position" in
order to more effectively accomplish the mission of both organizations.1 6 8
However, this leadership structure can also allow the President to evade
checks on his power by blurring the traditional lines between intelligence
and military activities and more freely classifying cyber military operations as covert action and vice versa. Nonetheless, despite calls to bifurcate the NSA and USCYBERCOM leadership, President Obama
pledged to keep U.S. cyber intelligence and warfare activities under the
same umbrella when he appoints General Alexander's replacement in
2014.169
V.

A.

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY To REGULATE EXECUTIVE

ACTiON

Constitutionally-CreatedChecks on the Executive

The power to "raise and support" the military17 o is a powerful tool for
Congress to check the war-making authority of the President,' 7 ' because
executive command of the military is limited to the operational capacity
funded by congressional appropriations. 7 2 Additionally, Congress can
attach restraints and reporting requirements to authorizations and appro-

166. Id.
167. David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, Obama to Keep Security Agency and
Cyberwarfare Under a Single Commander (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
12/14/us/politics/obama-to-keep-security-agency-and-cyberwarfare-under-a-single-commander.html.
168. See id. (quoting Caitlin Hayden, spokeswoman for the National Security
Council).
169. Id.

170. U.S. CONs-r. art I, § 8, cl. 12.
171. See generally Mackubin Owens, Essays on Article I: Army Clause, The Heritage
Guide to the Constitution,THi-ii HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/
articles/l/essays/52/army-clause (last visited June 12, 2014) (explaining the intent of the
founders' was to grant Congress the authority to control the existence and continual financing of a standing military as a check on the power of the Executive Branch).
172. See Yoo & Ho, supra note 51 ("[T]he President may be Commander in Chief, but
he had nothing to command except what Congress may provide.").
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priations to ensure executive compliance with congressional standards
and oversight.' 73

B.

The War Powers Resolution

In response to the Vietnam War, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, over President Nixon's veto, to "fulfill the intent of the framers
of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities." 74 The Resolution limits the authority of the President to introduce the U.S. military
into "hostilities" to occasions where (1) Congress has issued a declaration
of war, (2) Congress has specifically authorized statutory authority for
military engagement, or (3) a national emergency.' 7 5 Furthermore, if the
President has committed troops to hostilities, but no declaration of war
has been granted, then the Executive is required to comply with initial
and continuous reporting requirements to Congress.' 7 6 The President
must terminate military action sixty days after the initial report is filed,
unless Congress has declared war, authorized the use of force, granted a
sixty-day extension, or is physically unable to meet.1 77
C.

Congressional Limitations on Covert Action

In a similar fashion, Congress also passed legislation in the aftermath
of the Iran-Contra scandal to increase congressional oversight of covert
actions." 8 As a result, the President is compelled to "keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert
actions.""' This requires the Executive to file presidential findings with
each committee to confirm the legality of such operations.so However,
the Executive may limit the audience for a finding to a group of eight

173. See RotuNS & HENNING, supra note 26, at 16 (discussing congressional capabilities to regulate Executive Branch authority to operate a cyber military arsenal).

174. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2006).
175. § 1541(c).
176. § 1543(a).
177. § 1544(b).
178. See BRADu1Y & GoLDsmiuH, supra note 47, at 274-80 (discussing the history of
the creation and evolution of covert action and the accompanying reporting requirements
which are incorporated as part of the Commander-in-Chief's national security apparatus).

179. § 413b(b)(1).
180. See § 413b(a) (detailing the necessity and process for presidential findings regarding covert action).
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critical representatives if the President determines limited access is essential for a specific covert action. 18
D.

Executive Mitigation of Legislative Restraints

On the other hand, the Executive is not rendered powerless by the
aforementioned legislative restraints on presidential authority. Instead,
the President can employ measures to counteract the limitations applied
by Congress. First, each year the President is required to submit a detailed budget request to Congress for the following fiscal year.' 82 This
comprehensive plan allows the President to suggest to Congress how discretionary funds should be utilized in the upcoming year."8 3 The President's budget also recommends funding levels for each discretionary
government program.18 4 Thus, the President is allowed to proclaim--to
Congress and the public-his proposal for the requisite funding of the
U.S. military.' 85
Second, each president since the passage of the War Powers Resolution
has characterized the Resolution as an unconstitutional limitation on executive authority.' 8 6 During this time, presidents have utilized the U.S.
military in sixteen significant engagements and scores of minor operations." Only three of these operations were "baptized" by Congress. 8
Therefore, in all other situations the "presidents justified their actionsin whole or in part-under the Commander in Chief and related presidential powers."189 Presidents of both parties have continuously ignored
the War Powers Resolution, or merely taken notice
of it and submitted
90
documentation "consistent with" the Resolution.'

181. § 413b(c)(2). The congressional "Gang of Eight" may be restricted by the President to "chairman and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority
and minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of the congressional leadership as may be included by the President." Id.
182. Robert Langley, About the President'sAnnual Budget Request, U.S. Government
Info, AnouT.com, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/federalbudgetprocess/a/budgetprop.htm

(last visited June 12, 2014).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. ROLLINS & HENNING, supra note 26, at 15.
187. BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH-, supra note 47, at 268-69.
188. Id.
189. Id at 269.
190. See ROLLINS & HENNING, supra note 26, at 15 (citing RICHARD F. GRIMMETI,
CONG RESEARCH SERv., RL33532, WAR PowERs RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE (2012) for more information on presidential actions in accordance with the War
Power Resolution).
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Additionally, the Executive Branch has consistently utilized the statutory language of the Resolution to circumvent congressional authority.' 9
For example, the Clinton Administration argued the specific appropriation of funds for a military operation was tantamount to a congressional
authorization for the continuation of military activities after the sixty-day
deadline imposed by the Resolution.1 9 2 More recently, the Obama Administration declared a limited military engagement, as determined by an
examination of the mission, exposure of forces, risk of escalation, and
required military means, could be exempted from the Resolution's sixtyday withdrawal provision, because it does not rise to the level of "hostilities" envisioned by the Resolution's drafters. 9 3
Finally, the Executive may order the Department of Defense to classify
covert operations by the military as "operational preparation of the environment," instead of intelligence activities.194 This classification allows
the President to circumvent the reporting requirements of covert action,
because the operation is subject to the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees rather than the Intelligence Committees.' 95 The reporting requirements for the former are less rigorous than
those of the latter.1 9 6
VI.
A.

CYBER WAR AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

The Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. Test

As discussed in previous sections, the Legislative and Executive
Branches possess independent and concurrent powers related to the U.S.
military and war. As a result, the President, and to a lesser extent Congress, have attempted to mold the developing field of cyber warfare.
However, the ultimate balance of power for cyber war is best examined
through application of the test formulated by Justice Robert Jackson in
his concurring opinion to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer."'

191. See BRADLEY & GojsMrrH, supra note 47, at 259-64 (exploring Executive
Branch attempts in the Clinton and Obama Administrations to circumvent the congressional restrictions imposed by the War Powers Resolution).
192. Id. at 259-62.
193. Id. at 262-64.
194. Dycus, supra note 71, at 161.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 161, n.42 (implying that the congressional defense committees do not
scrutinize operations in the same manner as intelligence committees).
197. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see ROLLINS & HENNING, supra note 26, at 11 (analyzing the Steel Seizure Cases
and the usefulness of Justice Jackson's concurring opinion for determining the extent of
presidential authority to make war).
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Also referred to as "The Steel Seizure Case," Youngstown Sheet
Tube Co. considered the ability of the President to unilaterally assert Executive control over private industry in the name of national security." 8
President Truman claimed the Commander-in-Chief clause afforded him
the power to take control of the steel industry to prevent a strike, because
steel production was essential to support the military action in Korea." 9
The Supreme Court rejected this assertion of executive authority. 200
In a famous concurring opinion, Justice Jackson reasoned the inherent
constitutional powers of the Executive "fluctuate" from high to low depending upon their relationship to actions taken by Congress.20 1 When
the President acts in a manner authorized by Congress, executive power
is at its zenith; but when the Executive "takes measures incompatible
with the express or implied will of Congress" presidential power is at its
"lowest ebb." 2 02 Thus, Justice Jackson outlined three zones of executive
action: "(1) action supported by an express or implied grant of authority
from Congress; (2) a 'zone of twilight' between the other categories, in
which 'congressional inertia' can occasionally 'enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility'; and (3) action that conflicts with statutes or congressional intent." 2 0 3
B.

Zone One: The Zenith of Executive Authority

Presidential acts in response to a congressional grant of power represent the apex of executive authority because the President does not
have to rely solely on inherent Article 1I powers. 2 0 4 Therefore, if Congress authorizes presidential action by legislation, pursuant to the enumerated powers of Article I, the President possesses full authority to
execute the mission, as detailed by statute.20 5

198. See generally Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (limiting the ability of President Truman
to use his Commander-in-Chief powers during the Korean War to forestall a steel industry
strike in the name of national defense).

199. Id. at 582, 678.
200. Id. at 587-89.
201. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
203. RoLLINS & HENNING, supra note 26, at 12.
204. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that presidential power is at its highest when acting as the result of a congressional act; at its lowest
when acting counter to a congressional act; and somewhere in between when Congress is

silent).
205. See id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that "[w]hen the president acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority . . . includes all
that he possesses on his own plus all that Congress can delegate" and that the only reason
his action could be held unconstitutional is if "Federal Government as an undivided whole
lacks power" to carry out the action).
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In NDAA-FY12, Congress statutorily recognized the ability of the
President to conduct offensive military operations in cyberspace.2 0 6
NDAA-FY13 re-affirmed the offensive capabilities of the President and
formally recognized the executive authority to initiate defensive cyber action. 20 7 Thus, NDAA-FY12 and NDAA-FY13 afford the President statutory authorization to conduct offensive and defensive cyber warfare.2 0 8
The only constraints placed on executive authority are those explicitly
stated in NDAA-FY12. 2 09 However, the President must also refrain from
violating other provisions of the Constitution. 2 10 As a result, the powers
President Obama reserved for the Executive in PPD-20 are supported by
the zenith of executive authority.
C.

Zone Two: The Twilight Zone

The second zone of Justice Jackson's analysis governs situations where
presidential and congressional authorities overlap. 211 A subsequent Supreme Court case, Dames & Moore v. Regan,212 articulated the necessary
separation-of-powers evaluation for cases that fall within this zone of twilight.213 In Dames, the Court said the analysis "hinges on a consideration
of all the circumstances which might shed light on the views of the legislative branch toward [the Executive's] action, including 'congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence.'214 Thus, congressional interest in the
issue must be measured and weighed against executive action.

206. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,

§ 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011).

207. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112239, § 940, 126 Stat. 1632, 1888-89 (2012) (reaffirming the congressional recognition of
presidential power to conduct offensive cyber warfare).
208. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that
even when the President is given power that has been authorized Congress he must act
within the confines of what the Constitution allows or the President's actions may be found
to be unconstitutional).
209. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 954, 125 Stat. at
1551 ("upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to
defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to-(l) the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and (2) the War Powers Resolution) (emphasis added).
210. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that
"[w]hen the president acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his
authority . . . includes all that he possesses on his own plus all that Congress can delegate"
and that the only reason his action could be held unconstitutional is if "Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power" to carry out the action).
211. RoLLINS & HENNING, supra note 26, at 12.
212. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
213. ROLIuNs & HENNING, supra note 26, at 13.
214. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668-69.
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The statutory language of NDAA-FY12 and NDAA-FY13 recognized
executive authority and placed two separate restraints on
cyberwarfare. 2 15 Any other issues, where the statutes are silent, fall
within this twilight zone of power.2 16 Therefore, "congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence" must be determined to ascertain the breadth
of executive authority.2 1 7
The Bush Administration first addressed cyber war with the Comprehensive National Cyber Initiative of 2008.218 Since then Congress has
continually appropriated funds for military and covert operations focused
on cyberspace. 219 Therefore, legislative momentum, as seen through authorizations and appropriations, favors unilateral executive authority.
Moreover, Congress stood idly by as President Obama created USCYBERCOM, launched the Stuxnet virus attack on Iran, and issued
PPD-20. Thus, legislative acceptance of executive authority and an apathetic approach to oversight may be inferred from congressional silence,
outside of the aforementioned acts.
D.

Zone Three: The "Lowest Ebb" of Executive Authority

The President's authority is at its lowest level when executive action
exceeds legislative boundaries, because the President is forced to retreat
solely to the vested powers of Article I.220 Thus, the President's author-

215. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011) ("upon direction by the President may conduct offensive
operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to-(1) the
policy principles and legal regimes that the Departmentfollows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and (2) the War Powers Resolution) (emphasis added).
216. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668 (stating "[w]hen the President acts in the absence of congressional authorization he man enter 'a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain"').

217. Id. at 668-69.
218. See generally ROLLINS & HENNING, supra note 26 ("The [Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative] establishes a multipronged approach the federal government is to take in identifying current and emerging cyber threats, shoring up current and
future telecommunications and cyber vulnerabilities, and responding to or proactively addressing entities that wish to steal or manipulate protected data on secure federal
systems.").
219. See Michaels, supra note 92 (detailing the use of funds given by Congress to the
Department of Defense for cyber warfare operations).
220. See RoLuNs & HENNING, supra note 26, at 13 (remarking that "at least some
actions contemplated by the CNCI likely fall outside of the relatively straightforward and
narrow delegations of authority granted by statutes that specifically address cybersecurity[,]" and where Congress declines to act legislatively "the Executive Branch could
act in a number of situations by relying on inherent powers under Article I of the U.S.
Constitution or, in very limited circumstances on the 2001 Authorization to Use Military
Force").
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ity drops precipitously if executive action is counter to or exceeds these
boundaries.22 1
According to NDAA-FY12, cyber operations are restricted by the
same legal parameters as kinetic warfare and are subjected to the strictures of the War Powers Resolution.2 22 Consequently, the use of forces
outside of these parameters would require the President to rely on Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers to initiate cyber war activities.22 3 For example, the President would need to couch the utilization of
cyber force in an act of self-defense or a mission to protect national interests. The latter would also require the President to establish that the nature, scope, and duration of the cyber mission precludes the need for
congressional authorization, and is such that it is outside the realm of
"hostilities" addressed by the War Powers Resolution. 2 2 4 Otherwise, the
President is forced to act upon power that can be checked or overridden
by the constitutional and statutory power of Congress.22 5
VII.

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND UNILATERAL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
TO CONDUCT CYBER WARFARE

Much like traditional, kinetic warfare, cyber war can be devastating to
the infrastructure, economy, and health and safety of a civilian population. 22 6 However, unlike other types of war, the weaponry and machinations of cyber war are largely invisible. Thus, lack of perceptibility and
the general sense of detachment citizens feel from cyber-related activities
could allow for the U.S. Government, at the sole direction of the President, to prepare for and engage in a perpetual state of cyber war. This
constant state of war not only presents a threat to the welfare of Ameri-

221. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638(1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (pointing out that if a President were able to act outside of his power and
those not given to him by Congress, "the equilibrium established by or constitutional sys-

tem" would be at stake).
222. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011).

223. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that
"[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress ... he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.").
224. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2006) (indicating the three situations where the President as Commander-in-Chief may commit U.S. armed forces to hostilities); see also
§ 1543(a) (explaining what the President must report to Congress if U.S. armed forces are
introduced to hostilities without a declaration of war).
225. See § 1544(b) (stating that the President must terminate any use of the U.S.
armed forces within sixty days unless Congress allows one of the three exceptions listed).
226. Sanger, supra note 146 (implying that the U.S. cyberattack on Iran using the
Stuxnet virus caused a lot of damage to infrastructure and the economy of Iran).
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can citizens; but if history is any judge, it will most likely lead to the degradation and erosion of civil liberties.
Throughout American history the United States has traditionally restricted civil liberties and attempted to punish citizens for dissent in times
of war.2 27 In 1798, with the nation nearing war with France, Congress
passed the Sedition Act, which made it illegal to speak ill of the government, Congress, or the President. 2 28 "[D]uring the Civil War, President
Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus" and many of his critics
were imprisoned. 2 2 9 Opposition to the war or the draft was again punishable by imprisonment during World War I, and dissent or Japanese heritage were unfortunately enough to justify deportation or internment
during World War 11.230 The Cold War wrought mandatory loyalty programs, congressional investigations into the lives of citizens, and criminal
prosecutions for membership in communist organizations.231 Citizens
and media outlets alike were stifled and punished for participating in and
covering dissident political activities during the Vietnam War.23 2 And,
most recently, numerous intrusive intelligence measures, including the
NSA programs leaked by Edward Snowden,2 33 and even a drone strike
against an American citizen,23 4 were utilized in furtherance of the battle
against terrorism.
Therefore, this danger of diminishing civil liberties must be omnipresent in the minds of citizens, Congress, and the President as the United
States enters the invisible and sure to be recurring world of cyber war.
As long as the President can unilaterally thrust the nation into a cyber
war without meaningful debate or legislative regulations, the citizens of
the United States are merely a click of the mouse away from having their
civil liberties curtailed in favor of unfettered support for the government
in the name of national security.

227. See
THE SEDITION

GEOFFREY

R.

STONE,

PERILOUS

Acr oir 1798 TO THE WAR

TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME-FROM

ON TERRORISM

12 (2004) (discussing the history

of civil liberty restrictions imposed by the U.S. Government during the undeclared war
with France, the Civil War, World War 1, World War II, the Cold War, and the Vietnam
War).
228. Id.
229. Id.

230. Id.
231. Id. at 12-13.
232. Id. at 13.
233. See generally The NSA Files, TIE GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/the-nsa-files (last visited Sept. 20, 2014).
234. Spencer Ackerman, US cited controversiallaw in decision to kill American citizen
by drone, TiHE GUARDIAN (Jun. 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/
us-justification-drone-killing-american-citizen-awlaki (stating the US government cited an
anti-terrorism law in its justification for killing an American citizen with a drone attack).
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Shortly after his inauguration, President Obama approved the first
cyber act of war the world had ever seen.23 5 The Stuxnet virus was
deployed to destroy critical infrastructure in Iran, but along the way it
changed the course of modern warfare. 2 36 The United States had legitimized cyber war.
In preparation for this new realm of conflict, the President has developed new strategies, implemented policies, and made organizational
changes to prepare the U.S. military for cyber war. Congress, on the
other hand, has been slower to act. Congress has recognized the offensive and defensive cyber capabilities of the Executive Branch, but it has
done little to regulate this authority. Instead, Congress has halfheartedly
applied conventional warfare principles to an unconventional type of
combat.
Important restrictions on executive war-making authority remain unaddressed. For example, how does the "imminent threat" trigger of selfdefense relate to cyber attacks that can occur in a matter of seconds?
PPD-20 affords the President the authority to initiate offensive cyber action in the name of U.S. national interests. How are these national interests defined and to what extent may the President act without first
conferring with Congress? In NDAA-FY12, Congress declared cyber war
attacks are subject to the War Powers Resolution. But, how is an act of
war that requires no troops on the ground, eschews traditional weaponry,
and occurs at the speed of light, measured within a War Powers Resolution analysis? Furthermore, no structures are in place to distinguish between cyber military operation and covert cyber action. Thus, there is
nothing to stop the President from playing a shell game with cyber operations to avoid congressional oversight and the requirement for an authorization of force. Currently, President Obama, and his national security
team, classify all cyber attacks as clandestine and refuse to acknowledge
their existence or use. 2 37
As a result, cyber warfare is essentially an "open field" for the President to assert executive authority. Therefore, Congress must legislate
limitations on the President to prevent this unconventional, yet powerful

235. Sanger, supra note 146.
236. See CLARKF & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 295 (explaining how the Stuxnet virus
damaged computers at the Natanz, Iran nuclear facility).
237. Barton Gellman & Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Spy Agencies Mounted 231 Offensive
Cyber-Operations in 2011, Documents Show, WAs!s. Posr (Aug. 30, 2013), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231-offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011 -documents-show201 3/08/30/dO9Oa6ae-I19e-1 1 e3-b4cbfd7ce041 d814_story.html.
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method of war from becoming an unchecked tool of the Executive. However, at the same time, Congress must be careful not to statutorily handcuff the President from adapting cyber war strategies and rules of
engagement to meet the ever-evolving cyber battlefield. Thus, Congress
should implement a few specific statutory limitations on the Executive,
and utilize appropriations to assert oversight capabilities and shape the
parameters of cyber war.
As such, Congress should consider the following recommendations.
First, Congress should initiate legislation to develop a statutory definition
of cyber war. This definition should be flexible enough to account for
changes in technology, but it should also demarcate the point at which
presidential action must yield to congressional authorization. Congress
should then initiate legislation to differentiate between cyberwar operations and covert action. This distinction will determine the type of reporting requirements with which the President must comply for a cyber
mission.
Second, Congress should establish House and Senate sub-committees
of the Armed Services Committee specifically dedicated to cyber warfare.
Additionally, oversight restrictions for cyber military operations should
be tied to future defense appropriations. This will prevent the President
from hiding cyber operations under the guise of covert action and thereby
eschewing meaningful congressional reporting requirements. Cyber warfare employs non-traditional weaponry, but it is still a form of military
combat. Thus, the President's use of cyberweapons should be held to the
same accountability standards as those for the use of missiles, bombs, and
bullets.
Third, Congress should require the President to provide the necessary
committees with definition for imminent threat and the advancement of
national interests, for the purposes of cyber war. However, this information should remain classified to prevent foreign nations from discovering
the United States' threshold for the implementation of defensive and offensive cyber operations.
Fourth, Congress should amend the War Powers Resolution to account
for cyber war operations, or exclude cyberwar from the Resolution. If
Congress chooses the latter, it should author similar legislation to limit
the ability of the President to commit the United States to a cyber war
that could escalate quickly and last perpetually. Similarly, Congress
should host hearings and make recommendations to the President on the
applicability of conventional warfare principles, policies, and legal regimes to cyber war.
Finally, Congress should host hearings and make a recommendation to
the President regarding the commingling of leadership and funds at USCYBERCOM and the NSA. President Obama is resolute in his belief a
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single commander, and not separate leaders, should replace General Alexander as the boss of the NSA and USCYBERCOM. An outside advisory panel recently suggested otherwise, in the name of better civil liberty
protection, but the President remains undeterred.2 3 8 Thus, Congress
should bring in military strategy experts, intelligence officials, and representatives from civil liberty organizations to determine the most efficient
yet protective leadership structure for the cyber intelligence and warfare
apparatus.

238. Sanger & Shanker, supra note 167.
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